Massiah v. United States
Massiah v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 3, 1964 Decided May 18, 1964 Full case name Winston Massiah v. United States
Citations 377 U.S. 201 (more) 84 S. Ct. 1199; 12 L. Ed. 2d 246; 1964 U.S. LEXIS 1277 Prior history 307 F.2d 62 (2d cir.) reversed
Holding Once criminal proceedings have begun, the government cannot bypass the defendant's lawyer and try to elicit statements from the defendant. Court membership Chief Justice Earl Warren
Associate Justices Hugo Black · William O. Douglas Tom C. Clark · John M. Harlan II William J. Brennan, Jr. · Potter Stewart Byron White · Arthur Goldberg
Case opinions
Majority Stewart, joined by Goldberg, Brennan, Douglas, Black, Warren Dissent White, joined by Clark, Harlan Laws applied U.S. Const. amend. VI
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), [1]
was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the government from eliciting statements from the defendant about themselves after the point that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.
In Massiah, the defendant had been indicted on a federal narcotics charge. He retained a lawyer, pled not guilty, and was released on bail. A co-defendant, after deciding to cooperate with the government, invited Massiah to sit in his car and discuss the crime he was indicted on, during which the government listened in via a radio transmitter. During the conversation, Massiah made several incriminating statements, and those statements were introduced at trial to be used against him.
Massiah appealed his conviction, which was affirmed in part by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 307 F.2d 62. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the statements made by the defendant outside the presence of his attorney must be suppressed.
The Massiah rule applies to the use of testimonial evidence in criminal proceedings deliberately elicited by the police from a defendant after formal charges have been filed. The events that trigger the Sixth Amendment safeguards under Massiah are (1) the commencement of adversarial criminal proceedings and (2) deliberate elicitation of information from the defendant by governmental agents.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant a right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions. The purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial and to assure that our adversarial system of justice functions properly by providing competent counsel as an advocate for the defendant in his contest against the “prosecutorial forces” of the state.
The Sixth Amendment right “attaches” once the government has committed itself to the prosecution of the case by the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or
arraignment,". [2] Determining whether a particular event or proceeding constitutes the commencement of adversarial criminal proceedings requires both an examination of the rules of criminal procedure for the jurisdiction in which the crime is charged and the Supreme Courts cases dealing with the issue of
when formal prosecution begins. [3] Once adversarial criminal proceedings commence the right to counsel applies to all critical stages of the prosecution and investigation. A critical stage is "any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might
derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial." [4]
Government attempts to obtain incriminating statement related to the offense charged from the defendant by overt interrogation or surreptitious means is a critical stage and any information thus obtained is subject to suppression unless the government can show that an attorney was present or the defendant knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived his right to counsel. [5]
Deliberate elicitation is defined as the intentional creation of circumstances by government agents that are likely to produce incriminating information
from the defendant. [6] Clearly express questioning (interrogation) would qualify but the concept also extends to surreptitious attempts to acquire information from the defendant through the use of
undercover agents or paid informants. [7]
The definition of "deliberate elicitation" is not the same as the definition of "interrogation" under the Miranda rule. Miranda interrogation includes express questioning and any actions or statements that an officer would reasonably foresee as likely to cause an incriminating response. Massiah applies to express questioning and any attempt to deliberately and intentionally obtain incriminating information from the defendant regarding the crime charged. The difference is purposeful creation of an environment likely to produce incriminating information (Massiah) and action likely to induce an incriminating response even if that was not the officer's purpose or intent (Miranda).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific - the right only applies to post commencement attempts to obtain information
relating to the crime charged. [8] The right does not extend to uncharged offenses even those that are
factually related to the charged crime. [9]
As noted, information obtained in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counselis subject to suppression unless the governmentcan establish that the defendant waived his right to counsel. The waiver must be knowing, intelligent
and voluntary. [10] A valid Miranda waiver operates as a wavier of Sixth Amendment right.
Hide Massiah v. Miranda
1. Constitutional Basis - Miranda is based on the Fifth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Massiah is based on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
2. Attachment - Miranda: Custody + Interrogation. (Charging status irrelevant) Massiah: Formally Charged + Deliberate Elicitation. (Custodial status irrelevant)
3. Scope a. Miranda applies to custodial interrogation by known governmental agents. Surreptitious acquisition of incriminating information allowed.
a. Massiah applies to overt and surreptitious interrogation.
b. Miranda is not offense specific. [11] b. Massiah is
offense specific. [12]
c. Miranda: interrogation + "functional equivalent" c. Massiah: interrogation + "deliberate elicitation"
4. Waiver: Both Miranda and Massiah rights may be waived.
5. Assertion: In each case, the assertion must be clear and unequivocal. The effects of assertionare not identical. For purposes of Miranda, the police must immediately cease the interrogation and cannot resume interrogating the defendant about any offense charged or uncharged unless counsel is present or defendant initiates contact for purposes of resuming interrogation and valid waiver obtained. Because Massiah is offense-specific, an assertion of the sixth amendment right to counsel requires the police to cease interrogating the defendant about any charged offense. Apparently the police could continue questioning the defendant about uncharged crimes assuming that the defendant was not in custody. The defendant's remedy would be to
leave or to refuse to answer questions. [13]
6. Remedy for violation: The remedy for violation of fifth and sixth amendment rights to counselare identical. The statements and testimonial information is subject to suppression. Derivative evidence is not subject to suppression under Miranda - fruit of poisonous tree doctrine may apply
to Massiah violation. [14] Both Miranda and Massiah defective statements can be used for impeachment purposes.
7. Exceptions: The primary exceptions to Miranda are (1) the routine booking questions exception (2) the jail house informant exception and (3) the public safety exception. In Moulton v. Maine the Supreme Court refused to recognize a public safety exception
to the Massiah rule. [15] Massiah allows for the use of jail house informants provided the informants
serve merely as "passive listeners." [16]
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Hide Massiah and the Voluntariness Standard
The Massiah rule is also to be contrasted with the vountariness standard of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. [17] The voluntariness standard applies to all police interrogations regardless of the custodial status of the suspect and regardless of whether the suspect has been formally charged. The remedy for a violation of the standard is complete suppression of the statement and any evidence derived from the statement. The statement cannot be used as either substantive evidence of guilt or to
impeach the defendant's testimony. [18] The reason for the strictness is the common law's aversion to the use of coerced confessions because of their inherent unreliability. Further the rights to be free from coerced confession cannot be waived nor is it necessary that the victim of coercive police conduct assert his right. In considering the voluntariness standard one must consider the Supreme Court's
decision in Colorado v. Connelly. [19] Although federal courts' application of the Connelly rule has been inconsistent and state courts have often failed to appreciate the consequences of the case, Connelly clearly marked a significant change in the application of the voluntariness standard. Before Connelly the test was whether the confession was voluntary considering the totality of the
circumstances. "Voluntary" carried its everyday meaning - the confession had to be a product of the exercise of the defendant's free will rather than
police coercion. After Connelly the totality of circumstances test is not even trigered unlessthe
defendant can show coercive police conduct.
Questions of free will and rational decision making are irrelevant to a due process claim unless police misconduct existed and a causal connection can be shown between the misconduct and the
confession.
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